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Introduction
Since the day he was sworn into office as the forty-fifth president of 
the United States, President Donald Trump has ignited fierce and daily con-
troversy.  Many of the president’s statements, such as his comments about 
undocumented immigrants and white supremacists, have alarmed people 
and enflamed passions across the country.  Other statements made by Presi-
dent Trump, such as his twitter tirades about voter fraud, media bias, and the 
impeachment process, have threatened to undermine the public’s faith in our 
country’s democratic institutions.  Yet, President Trump’s actions are likely to 
have even more significant and lasting impacts than his rhetoric.  Some of the 
president’s most recent and controversial actions—like his declaration of a 
National Emergency to secure funds to build a wall on the country’s southern 
border—have revived longstanding debates about presidential power and fed-
eral management of public lands.1
1. See Charlie Savage and Robert Pear, 16 States Sue to Stop Trump’s Use of Emergency 
Powers to Build Border Wall, N.Y. Times (Feb. 18, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/18/
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One of the most publicized and controversial actions President Trump 
has taken with respect to federal public lands since assuming office involves 
the reduction of national monuments.  During the 2016 presidential campaign, 
Trump promised repeatedly to undo various actions by President Barack 
Obama and to open up more federal lands to oil and gas production.2  On 
April 26, 2017, President Trump took the first step toward fulfilling these prom-
ises by issuing Executive Order 13792, titled “Review of Designations Under 
the Antiquities Act.”3  The order directed the Secretary of the Interior to con-
duct a review of all national monuments designated since 1996 that covered 
at least 100,000 acres and to provide a report to the president with recom-
mendations for reductions to any monuments the Secretary deemed as not 
“made in accordance with the requirements and original objectives” of the 
Antiquities Act.4  The order also empowered the Secretary of the Interior to 
review and make recommendations regarding any national monuments estab-
lished since 1996 for which “the Secretary determines that the designation or 
expansion was made without adequate public outreach and coordination with 
relevant stakeholders.”5  The order singled out Bears Ears—a national mon-
ument established by President Obama covering about 1.35 million acres in 
Utah—as one of the first national monuments to be considered for reduction.6
On June 10, 2017, after holding a four-day listening tour in Utah to hear 
from community representatives, former Secretary of the Interior Ryan Zinke 
submitted an interim report to the president recommending that Trump declare 
significant reductions to Bears Ears National Monument.7  President Trump 
us/politics/national-emergency-lawsuits-trump.html [https://perma.cc/9VUT-ACV9].  After 
President Trump declared a National Emergency on February 15, 2019 in an attempt to 
divert $3.6 billion in military construction funds for his proposed border wall, a coalition 
of 16 states including California and New York challenged the president’s actions in court. 
Id.  The states claim the president overstepped his constitutional authority by circumvent-
ing Congress.  Id.; see also Michael Tackett, Trump Issues First Veto After Congress Rejects 
Border Emergency, N.Y. Times (Mar. 15, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/15/us/
politics/trump-veto-national-emergency.html [https://perma.cc/JU4T-QTXA] (discussing 
President Trump’s veto of a Senate resolution which attempted to overturn the diversion of 
funds for the border wall).
2. See Noah Bierman, Donald Trump Promises To “Lift The Restrictions on American 
Energy” in Appeal to Fracking Industry, L.A. Times (Sept. 22, 2016), https://www.latimes.com/
politics/la-fi-trump-fracking-20160922-snap-story.html [https://perma.cc/HU6N-YTD5].
3. Exec. Order No. 13,792, 82 Fed. Reg. 20,429 (Apr. 26, 2017).
4. Id.; see also 54 U.S.C. § 32030 et seq. (2012).  The language used in the Antiquities 
Act describes the Act’s requirements and objectives broadly, allowing the president to des-
ignate “historic landmarks, historic and prehistoric structures, and other objects of historic 
or scientific interest” on public lands as national monuments, though facially requiring that 
these designations be limited in size to the “smallest area compatible” with proper manage-
ment of the objects to be protected.  See infra notes 27–28 and accompanying text.
5. Exec. Order No. 13,792, 82 Fed. Reg. 20,429.
6. Id.
7. Memorandum from Ryan K. Zinke, Sec’y of the Interior, to President Donald 
Trump, Interim Report Pursuant to Executive Order 13,792 (June 10, 2017), https://www.doi.
2020 DOWNSIzING NATIONAL MONUMENTS 81
subsequently issued two proclamations on December 4, 2017, which downsized 
Bears Ears by 85 percent8 and Grand Staircase-Escalante by about 46 percent.9 
The president justified the reductions in both proclamations by claiming that 
many of the protected objects at Bears Ears and Grand Staircase-Escalante 
are “not unique to the monument[s]” and are “not of significant scientific or 
historic interest.”10  Both proclamations also stated that many of the objects at 
Bears Ears and Grand Staircase-Escalante are “not under threat of damage or 
destruction such that they require a reservation of land to protect them.”11  The 
reductions of both national monuments went into effect on February 2, 2018.12
Former Secretary Zinke issued his final report on December 5, 2017, the 
day after President Trump announced the reductions to Bears Ears and Grand 
Staircase-Escalante.13  In his report, Zinke reviewed a total of 27 national mon-
uments designated under the Antiquities Act since 1996.14  Zinke solicited 
public comment during his review, and admitted in his report that “[c]omments 
received were overwhelmingly in favor of maintaining existing monuments.”15 
The Secretary nevertheless recommended changes to a number of national 
monuments “to protect traditional multiple use” and dismissed the comments 
of those opposing the changes as merely “demonstrat[ing] a well-orchestrated 
national campaign organized by multiple organizations.”16  In addition to the 
gov/sites/doi.gov/files/uploads/final_interim_report_about_monuments.pdf [https://perma.
cc/B2L9-4P34];  see also Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Secretary Zinke Submits 
45-Day Interim Report on Bears Ears National Monument and Extends Public Comment 
Period (June 12, 2017), https://www.doi.gov/pressreleases/secretary-zinke-submits-45-day- 
interim-report-bears-ears-national-monument-and-extends [https://perma.cc/JDE4-7HGE].
8. Proclamation No. 9681, 82 Fed. Reg. 58,081 (Dec. 4, 2017).
9. Proclamation No. 9682, 82 Fed. Reg. 58,089 (Dec. 4, 2017);  see also Juliet Eilperin, 
zinke Backs Shrinking of More National Monuments and Shifting Management of 10, 
Wash. Post (Dec. 5, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health- science/zinke-
backs-shrinking-more-national-monuments-shifting-management-of-10- others/2017/12/05/
e116344e-d9e5-11e7-b1a8-62589434a581_story.html?utm_term=.b430ddbc597f [https://
perma.cc/WDE3-FPQ2].
10. Proclamation No. 9681, 82 Fed. Reg. 58,081; Proclamation No. 9682, 82 Fed. Reg. 
58,089.
11.  Id.
12. See Hannah Nordhaus, What Trump’s Shrinking of National Monuments Actually 
Means, Nat’l Geographic (Feb. 2, 2018), https://news.nationalgeographic.com/2017/12/
trump-shrinks-bears-ears-grand-staircase-escalante-national-monuments [https://perma.
cc/8V76-8BMK].
13. Memorandum from Ryan K. Zinke, Sec’y of the Interior, to President Donald 
Trump, Final Report Summarizing Findings of the Review of Designations Under the 
Antiquities Act (Dec. 5, 2017), https://www.doi.gov/sites/doi.gov/files/uploads/revised_final_
report.pdf [https://perma.cc/2DWQ-FRM3].  Zinke’s review included national monuments 
in Arizona, California, Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho, Maine, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, 
Oregon, Utah, and Washington, as well as five marine monuments.  Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 3.
16. Id.
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reductions of Bears Ears and Grand Staircase-Escalante in Utah, Zinke’s 
report recommended that President Trump downsize Nevada’s Gold Butte 
and Oregon’s Cascade-Siskiyou National Monuments.  Zinke’s report further 
suggested amending the proclamations of six other national monuments to 
ensure that activities such as grazing, hunting, fishing, and timber harvesting 
could continue.17
Former Secretary Zinke’s report instantly became a topic of fierce 
debate in public discourse.  Conservative lawmakers praised the Secretary’s 
recommendations as a first step toward ending federal overreach18 while con-
servation advocates and tribal representatives protested that reducing national 
monuments and federal public lands protections via presidential proclamation 
was both unwise and unconstitutional.19  Critics of the proposed national mon-
ument reductions have also attacked Zinke’s review process, arguing that the 
Secretary ignored or suppressed evidence of the benefits of national monu-
ments, such as increased tourism revenues and decreased vandalism, while 
tailoring his analysis to emphasize the potential value of logging, ranching, 
and energy development at existing national monument sites.20  Others have 
argued that Zinke’s public review process was a sham in its entirety, intended 
only to legitimize the exclusion of areas rich in oil and natural gas from existing 
17. See Juliet Eilperin, zinke Backs Shrinking of More National Monuments and 
Shifting Management of 10, Wash. Post (Dec. 5, 2017),  https://www.washingtonpost.
com/national/health-science/zinke-backs-shrinking-more-national-monuments-shifting- 
management-of-10-others/2017/12/05/e116344e-d9e5-11e7-b1a8-62589434a581_story.
html?utm_ term=.723b4483b213 [https://perma.cc/9JTN-ZSJ6] (discussing former Secretary 
Zinke’s recommended changes to the proclamations for the following national monuments: 
Northeast Canyons and Seamounts (Atlantic Ocean), Rose Atoll and the Pacific Remote 
Islands (Pacific Ocean), Organ Mountains-Desert Peaks and Rio Grande Del Norte (New 
Mexico), and Katahdin Woods and Waters (Maine)).
18. See Press Release, U.S Dep’t of the Interior, WTAS: President Trump and 
Secretary Zinke Praised for National Monument Report (Dec. 6, 2017), https://www.doi.
gov/ pressreleases/wtas-president-trump-and-secretary-zinke-praised-national-monument- 
report [https://perma.cc/5WYR-5HCZ] (noting a reference by Gov. Gary R. Herbert of Utah 
to the proposed national monument reductions as “an opportunity to push a reset button on 
these areas”).
19. See Josh Dawsey & Juliet Eilperin, Trump Shrinks Two Huge National Monuments 
in Utah, Drawing Praise and Protests, Wash. Post (Dec. 4, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/politics/trump-scales-back-two-huge-national-monuments-in-utah-drawing-praise-
and-protests/2017/12/04/758c85c6-d908-11e7-b1a8-62589434a581_story.html?utm_term=.
ec81c20cf6b4 [https://perma.cc/NSQ3-BZ3M].
20. See Juliet Eilperin, Trump Administration Officials Dismissed Benefits of National 
Monuments, Wash. Post (July 23, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/
health-science/trump-administration-officials-dismissed-benefits-of-national-monument
s/2018/07/23/5b8b1666-8b9a-11e8-a345-a1bf7847b375_story.html [https://perma.cc/YT67-
KCU9].  The accusations were first made after the Interior Department inadvertently posted 
certain internal communications online in response to FOIA requests made by various jour-
nalists and advocacy groups.  Id.
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national monuments.21  Secretary Zinke resigned about one year after he issued 
his report, amid allegations of various unrelated scandals.22
President Trump’s December 4, 2017 proclamations reducing the Bears 
Ears and Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monuments have been met with 
a similar furor.  On the same day that Trump announced the proposed reduc-
tions, Native American tribes and environmental groups filed lawsuits in the 
U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia challenging the president’s 
actions with respect to both national monuments as outside the scope of his 
constitutional authority.23  The plaintiffs in both cases have brought a number 
of claims against President Trump and his administration based on alleged 
violations of the Antiquities Act, the Administrative Procedure Act, and the 
separation-of-powers doctrine.24  A number of U.S. states have filed amicus 
briefs in both cases, and the merits of each case have yet to be addressed by the 
courts.25  Thus, the question of whether the Antiquities Act gives a president 
the authority to reduce or revoke national monument designations made by 
previous presidents remains a timely and highly controversial issue.
To more properly analyze this issue in the future, courts and legal scholars 
should closely examine past presidential and congressional actions regarding 
the management of federal public lands.  Part I of this Comment includes a 
brief review of how courts have historically approached challenges to national 
monument designations, before turning to the existing legal and scholarly 
debate regarding a president’s authority to reduce or revoke national monu-
ment protections under the Antiquities Act, paying special attention to the role 
of the Property Clause in the U.S. Constitution.  Part II discusses the difficulties 
of examining a president’s authority to reduce or revoke national monuments 
through Justice Jackson’s popular framework for assessing executive power, 
established in his famous concurrence from Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. 
Sawyer.26  This Part argues that courts should broaden their view of the issue by 
21. See Eric Lipton & Lisa Friedman, Oil Was Central in Decision to Shrink Bears Ears 
Monument, Emails Show, N.Y. Times (Mar. 2, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/02/
climate/bears-ears-national-monument.html [https://perma.cc/YT67-KCU9].  President 
Trump’s December 2017 reductions of the Bears Ears National Monument closely mirror 
the reductions proposed by former Utah Senator Orrin Hatch’s office to former Secretary 
Zinke in March 2017, before the Secretary publicly initiated his review.  Id.  Senator Hatch 
claimed that these proposed reductions would “resolve all known mineral conflicts” in the 
area by excluding certain coal and natural gas deposits from the monument.  Id.
22. See Ben Lefebvre, zinke To Leave Interior Amid Scandals, Politico (Dec. 15, 2018), 
https://www.politico.com/story/2018/12/15/zinke-interior-secretary-leave-trump-1066653 
[https://perma.cc/D4LD-U5DX].
23. See Hopi Tribe v. Trump, No. 17-cv-2590, 2017 WL 6033876 (D.D.C. filed Dec. 4, 
2017); Wilderness Soc’y. v. Trump, No. 17-cv-2587, 2017 WL 6015958 (D.D.C. filed Dec. 4, 
2017); see also Michael Nordskog, Tribes, Environmental Groups Sue Trump Over National 
Monument Purge, 38 No. 11 WJENV 1 (2017).
24. See Hopi Tribe, 2017 WL 6015958; The Wilderness Society, 2017 WL 6015958.
25. See Hopi Tribe, 2017 WL 6015958; The Wilderness Society, 2017 WL 6015958.
26. 343 U.S. 579, 634–38 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
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examining how the Property Clause has historically been applied to Congress 
and the president.  As demonstrated below, such an analysis reveals that Con-
gress’s powers in the Property Clause context have repeatedly been interpreted 
broadly, whereas the president’s powers in this area have been more fiercely 
questioned and challenged.  Finally, Part III touches on how this historical 
evidence interacts with existing legal precedent and the ways in which it can 
help inform the current debate about whether President Trump has the legal 
authority under the Antiquities Act to reduce preexisting national monuments.
I. Challenges to National Monument Designations and the 
Current Legal Debate
The Property Clause of the U.S. Constitution states: “Congress shall have 
Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the 
Territory or other Property belonging to the United States.”27  In 1906, Congress 
delegated part of this authority to the president by passing the Antiquities Act, 
which granted the president unilateral authority to “declare by public procla-
mation historic landmarks, historic and prehistoric structures, and other objects 
of historic or scientific interest that are situated upon the lands owned or con-
trolled by the Government of the United States to be national monuments.”28 
The Act states that the president “may reserve parcels of land” in designating 
national monuments, but that the “limits of the parcels shall be confined to the 
smallest area compatible with proper care and management of the objects to 
be protected.”29  Part B, below, examines the relationship between the Property 
Clause and the Antiquities Act in greater detail.
A. National Monument Designations: A History of Presidential Discretion
The U.S. Supreme Court has only addressed a handful of cases that chal-
lenged the president’s authority to declare national monuments under the 
Antiquities Act, but it has consistently afforded wide discretion to presidents’ 
decisions to create and expand national monuments.  In Cameron v. United 
States,30 the Supreme Court considered a challenge to President Theodore 
Roosevelt’s designation of the Grand Canyon National Monument in Ari-
zona.  Before President Roosevelt designated the monument, the defendant in 
27. U.S. Const. art. IV, §  3, cl. 2.  Unlike most of Congress’s legislative powers, the 
Property Clause is listed in Article IV rather than Article I of the U.S. Constitution.  Legal 
scholars disagree on the reasons for this.  Some have argued that the Property Clause makes 
logical sense in close proximity to the Admission Clause in Article IV, while at least one 
scholar has suggested that the authors of the U.S. Constitution considered federal pub-
lic lands management to be more administrative than legislative in nature.  See Lance F. 
Sorenson, The Hybrid Nature of the Property Clause: Implications for Judicial Review of 
National Monument Reductions, 21 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 761, 778–84 (2018), https://ssrn.com/
abstract=3147937.
28. 54 U.S.C. § 320301(a) (2012).
29. Id. § 320301(b).
30. 252 U.S. 450 (1920).
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Cameron established a mining claim on the South Rim of the Grand Canyon 
near the trailhead for the popular Bright Angel Trail, used by tourists to access 
the canyon.31  The defendant occupied this tract of land and charged tourists 
a fee to cross it to access the Bright Angel Trail.  The defendant continued to 
do so even after the Department of the Interior found his mining claim invalid 
and President Roosevelt declared the Grand Canyon a national monument.32 
When the U.S. government filed a lawsuit to force the defendant off of the land, 
the defendant challenged the president’s designation of the Grand Canyon 
as a national monument under the Antiquities Act, claiming that the Grand 
Canyon was not of sufficient historic or scientific interest.33  The Supreme 
Court firmly rejected this argument and upheld the president’s designation of 
the Grand Canyon National Monument as lawful under the Antiquities Act.34 
Although not explicitly addressed in the case, the Supreme Court gave the 
president wide discretion in meeting the Antiquities Act’s requirement that 
reserved land be limited to the “smallest area compatible” with proper care 
and management by upholding President Roosevelt’s designation of the entire 
Grand Canyon National Monument as a whole.35
In a more recent decision, the Supreme Court analyzed the extent to 
which a president’s designation of a national monument also implies a reserva-
tion of the groundwater that filters into and out of the monument’s boundaries. 
The defendants in Cappaert v. United States were a family of ranchers who 
lived about two and a half miles from Devil’s Hole, a deep, pool-filled lime-
stone cavern within the borders of Death Valley National Monument in 
Nevada.36  The defendants began pumping groundwater on their ranch in 
1968.  Three years later, the U.S. government sued to enjoin their groundwa-
ter pumping after discovering the defendants’ actions were reducing the water 
levels in Devil’s Hole; the government was concerned that this reduction 
posed a danger to the Devil’s Hole “pupfish” that lived there.37  The defen-
dants argued in response that the president’s designation of Death Valley 
National Monument did not include the groundwater which they pumped 
from outside the monument’s boundaries.38  The Supreme Court again sided 
with the U.S. government, affirming the lower court’s ruling that “the Presi-
dent reserved appurtenant, unappropriated waters necessary to the purpose of 
31. Id. at 456.
32. Id. at 458 n.1.
33. Id. at 455.
34. Id.
35. See Matthew W. Harrison, Legislative Delegation and Presidential Authority: The 
Antiquities Act and the Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monument—A Call For A New 
Judicial Examination, 13 J. Envtl. L. & Litig. 409, 416–17 (1998).  President Roosevelt’s des-
ignation of the Grand Canyon National Monument covered about 800,000 acres—by far the 
largest reservation of land under the Antiquities Act up to that point in time.  Id.
36. Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 131–33 (1976).
37. Id. at 133–35.
38. Id.
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the reservation,” which was to preserve the pool and the pupfish in it.39  While 
the court’s decision largely rested on President Truman’s inclusion of the Dev-
il’s Hole pool and its pupfish as among the “objects of historic or scientific 
interest” to be protected, it also confirmed that the president’s authority under 
the Antiquities Act reached reservations of water which the president had not 
explicitly designated in his proclamation.40
U.S. Federal District Courts have similarly given wide discretion to pres-
idents when reviewing legal challenges to national monument designations 
under the Antiquities Act; however, one case in the Federal District Court 
of Alaska has raised questions about the limits of presidential designations. 
In Anaconda Copper v. Andrus, the court reviewed a challenge to President 
Carter’s withdrawal of over 56 million acres in Alaska under the Antiquities 
Act for the creation of 15 new national monuments and the expansion of two 
preexisting monuments.41  In a bench ruling on a motion for partial summary 
judgment, the court strongly criticized the size of President Carter’s designa-
tions, suggesting that he had exceeded his authority under the Antiquities Act 
by violating the Act’s requirement that national monument designations be 
limited to the “smallest area compatible” with proper care and management of 
the objects that the monument is intended to protect.42  However, before a final 
judgment was reached, the case became moot due to Congress’s passage of the 
Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act43 (ANILCA) in 1980.44
Subsequent decisions by U.S. Courts of Appeals have reaffirmed the pres-
ident’s broad discretion when creating and expanding national monuments 
under the Antiquities Act.  In Tulare County. v. Bush, the D.C. Circuit dismissed 
a challenge to President Clinton’s designation of the Giant Sequoia National 
Monument, which encompasses 327,769 acres in south-central California.45 
The plaintiffs argued that President Clinton had not “made any meaningful 
investigation or determination of the smallest area necessary” to protect the 
objects listed in his proclamation, but the court rejected this reasoning and 
held that “the Antiquities Act does not impose upon the President an obliga-
tion to make any particular investigation” when determining the size of a new 
national monument.46  The court instead reasoned that judicial review of a pres-
ident’s decision to establish a national monument under the Antiquities Act 
39. Id. at 136.
40. Harrison, supra note 35, at 418–19.
41. Anaconda Copper v. Andrus, 14 ERC 1853, No. A79-161  (D. Alaska1980); see 
Harrison, supra note 35, at 430–31; see also Richard M. Johannsen, Public Land Withdrawal 
Policy and the Antiquities Act, 56 Wash. L. Rev. 439, 457 (1981).
42. Harrison, supra note 35, at 430 n.141.  The court upheld the president’s designa-
tion of the monuments in Alaska as “areas of protected scientific interest” but questioned 
whether the size of the areas designated was appropriate under the Antiquities Act.  Id.
43. 16 U.S.C. § 3209 (2012).
44. Harrison, supra note 35, at 431.
45. Tulare County. v. Bush, 306 F.3d 1138, 1140–42 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
46. Id. at 1142.
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must be approached narrowly, and that the district court had acted properly 
“in limiting its review to the face of the Proclamation rather than reviewing the 
President’s discretionary factual determinations,” such as the appropriate size 
of the monument.47  On the same day that it decided Tulare County v. Bush, the 
D.C. Circuit rejected similar challenges to six other national monuments estab-
lished by President Clinton near the end of his second term.48
More recently, the Federal District Court for the District of Columbia 
grappled with a new type of challenge to President Obama’s designation of the 
Northeast Canyons and Seamounts Marine National Monument in the Atlan-
tic Ocean.49  The plaintiffs in Massachusetts Lobstermen’s Association v. Ross 
claimed that President Obama’s designation of the Northeast Canyons and 
Seamounts National Monument violated the Antiquities Act in three ways: (1) 
the submerged lands of the Canyons and Seamounts did not meet the proper 
definition of “lands” under the Act; (2) the federal government did not “con-
trol” the lands in question; and (3) the lands reserved by President Obama 
exceeded the “smallest area compatible” with proper management as required 
by the Act.50  The court rejected all three of plaintiffs’ arguments, holding 
that the president’s designation of the Northeast Canyons and Seamounts as 
a marine national monument was lawful under the Antiquities Act.51  While 
the court noted that the legality of the president’s proclamation was judicially 
reviewable as a threshold matter, it cautioned that review of the president’s 
determination with respect to the monument’s proper size “stands on shak-
ier ground [because] courts cannot adjudicate such claims without considering 
the facts underlying the President’s determination.”52  The court reasoned that 
judicial review of a national monument’s size would be available “only if the 
plaintiff were to offer plausible and detailed factual allegations” regarding 
the monument’s size, and determined that the plaintiffs had not done so in 
this case.53  In holding that judicial review of presidential proclamations creat-
ing national monuments is limited and that it would have been inappropriate 
47. Id. at 1140.
48. Mountain States Legal Found. v. Bush, 306 F.3d 1132 (D.C. Cir. 2002)  (dismiss-
ing the plaintiffs’ claims that President Clinton’s proclamations designating the following 
national monuments lacked the requisite level of specificity under the Antiquities Act: 
Grand Canyon-Parashant, Ironwood Forest, and Sonoran Desert (Arizona), Canyons of 
the Ancients (Colorado), Cascade-Siskiyou (Oregon and California), and Hanford Reach 
(Washington)).
49. See Proclamation No. 9496, 81. Fed. Reg. 65,159 (Sep. 15, 2016).  President Obama’s 
proclamation covered approximately 4,913 square miles of underwater canyons and moun-
tains off the coast of New England.  Id.  The underwater ecosystem protected by the new 
national monument contains a diverse range of marine life and important ecological 
resources.  Id.
50. Massachusetts Lobstermen’s Ass’n v. Ross, 349 F. Supp. 3d 48, 51 (D.D.C. 2018).
51. Id.
52. Id. at 55.
53. Id.
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in this case, the court further confirmed the expansive authority afforded to 
presidents under the Antiquities Act.54
While the cases described above illustrate the broad discretion courts 
have given presidents when designating new national monuments under the 
Antiquities Act, these decisions offer little guidance with respect to a presi-
dent’s authority to reduce the size of existing national monuments.  Those in 
favor of national monument reductions might point to the broad discretion 
afforded to previous presidents and argue courts should give similar defer-
ence to presidents who attempt to reduce existing national monuments using 
their power under the Antiquities Act.  However, opponents of national mon-
ument reductions may just as readily rely on these same cases to argue the 
wide discretion given to previous presidents’ designations of national monu-
ments indicates that these designations should not be disturbed.  Because the 
cases described above can undoubtedly cut in either direction when applied 
in this context, federal precedent regarding the president’s discretion to desig-
nate new national monuments under the Antiquities Act is of limited utility to 
the debate on national monument reductions.
B. National Monument Reductions: The Current Debate
The crux of the current legal debate over whether a president has the 
constitutional authority to reduce national monuments hinges on the lan-
guage of the Antiquities Act and the Act’s relationship to the Property Clause. 
Opponents of national monument reductions argue that a plain reading of the 
text of the Antiquities Act indicates Congress intended the Act to serve as a 
one-way grant of specific and limited Property Clause authority to the presi-
dent, delegating to him the power to “reserve . . . parcels of land”55 that meet 
the Act’s requirements.56  The Antiquities Act is noticeably silent on whether 
a president has the authority to change or revoke national monument desig-
nations made by previous presidents, and opponents of monument reductions 
argue this authority lies solely with Congress under the Property Clause.57
In support of this argument, critics of monument reductions contrast the 
Antiquities Act’s silence on reducing or revoking national monuments against 
explicit revocation provisions included in other contemporaneous federal 
public lands laws.  For example, the Pickett Act of 1910 delegated authority 
to the president to “withdraw” public lands (or to reserve them for certain 
54. See supra notes 30–47 and accompanying text.
55. 54 U.S.C. § 320301(b).
56. See Mark Squillace, et al., Presidents Lack The Authority To Abolish Or Diminish 
National Monuments, 103 Va. L. Rev. Online 55, 57–58 (2017).
57. Id.; see also Kelly Y. Fanizzo, Separation of Powers and Federal Land Management: 
Enforcing the Direction Of the President Under the Antiquities Act, 40 Lewis & Clark Envtl. 
L. Rev. 765, 822 (2010); Robert D. Rosenbaum, No, President Trump Can’t Revoke National 
Monuments, Wash. Post (Mar. 29, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ opinions/no- 
president-trump-cant-revoke-national-monuments/2017/03/29/35e53336-10cd-11e7-ab07-
07d9f521f6b5_story.html [https://perma.cc/2C2V-N4CX].
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purposes) “until revoked by him or an Act of Congress.”58  Critics of mon-
ument reductions argue that this language in the Pickett Act demonstrates 
that Congress believed it needed to explicitly state the president’s authority 
to revoke withdrawals under the Act because the president did not otherwise 
have such powers, and that these same principles must apply to the Antiquities 
Act because it is likewise a limited delegation of Congress’s Property Clause 
powers to the president.59
Similarly, the Forest Service Organic Act of 1897 makes Congress’s inten-
tion to provide the president with the power to change and revoke existing 
national forest designations explicit by stating so in two different places within 
the statute.  The Act’s first substantive paragraph explains that “to remove any 
doubt60 which may exist pertaining to the authority of the President thereunto, 
the President of the United States is hereby authorized and empowered to 
revoke, modify, or suspend any and all such Executive orders and proclama-
tions” relating to national forests.61  The Act goes one step further by asserting 
that “[t]he President is hereby authorized at any time to modify any Executive 
order that has been or may hereafter be made establishing any forest reserve, 
and by such modification may reduce the area or change the boundary lines 
of such reserve, or may vacate altogether any order creating such reserve.”62 
Much like with the Pickett Act, opponents of monument reductions argue 
that Congress’s decision to include such clear statutory language in the Forest 
Service Organic Act authorizing the president to reduce or revoke national 
58. Pickett Act, Pub. L. No. 303, 36 Stat. 847 (1910) (repealed 1976) (emphasis added); 
see Squillace et al., supra note 56, at 58; see also Marla E. Mansfield, A Primer on Public Land 
Law, 68 Wash. L. Rev. 801, 825–26 (1993).  Congress passed the Pickett Act in response to a 
request from President Howard Taft for more authority to address growing concerns about 
the rapid increase in private mining claims on public lands in the western states.  Id.  The 
president was primarily concerned with the increased competition between private mining 
claimants and the U.S. government over oil reserves in the west that he saw as essential to 
supporting the U.S. Navy.  See David H. Getches, Managing the Public Lands: The Authority 
of the Executive to Withdraw Lands, 22 Nat. Resources J. 279, 290 (1982).
59. See Squillace et al., supra note 56, at 58. Critics of this reasoning have argued that 
reliance on the Pickett Act is inapposite due to the Act’s focus on temporary withdrawals. 
See Richard H. Seamon, Dismantling Monuments, 70 Fla. L. Rev. 553, 591 (2018) (arguing 
that “[t]he Pickett Act sheds no light on the Antiquities Act [because it] addressed only the 
President’s power to withdraw public lands temporarily.”).
60. At least one scholar has argued that Congress’s choice to include the phrase “to 
remove any doubt” in the Forest Service Organic Act was intended only to address the con-
cerns of President William McKinley, and that this language is not indicative of congressional 
intent.  See Lance F. Sorenson, supra note 27, at 801.  However, the absence of such clear 
language in the Antiquities Act undoubtedly contributes to the ongoing debate over a pres-
ident’s authority to reduce or revoke national monuments under the Act.
61. Forest Service Organic Act of 1897, ch. 2, 30 Stat. 34 (1897) (codified as amended at 
16 U.S.C. § 475 (2012)) (emphasis added).
62. Id. (emphasis added).
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forest designations highlights the absence of such authorizing language in the 
Antiquities Act.63
In further support of this argument, opponents of national monument 
reductions point to a 1938 opinion64 by Attorney General Homer Cummings 
analyzing the statutory language of these same laws and arriving at the same 
conclusion.65  Attorney General Cummings had been asked by the Secretary 
of the Interior whether the Antiquities Act authorized President Franklin 
D. Roosevelt to revoke Castle Pinckney National Monument in Charleston, 
South Carolina.66  In his opinion, Cummings contrasted the revocation lan-
guage described above in the Pickett Act and the Forest Service Organic Act 
against the lack of any such language in the Antiquities Act and concluded the 
Antiquities Act “does not in terms authorize the President to abolish national 
monuments, and no other statute containing such authority has been sug-
gested.”67  Critics have challenged Attorney General Cummings’s opinion on 
various grounds.68
Proponents of national monument reductions have responded to the 
arguments described above with several arguments of their own, many of 
which focus on the broad powers of the presidency.  For example, some sup-
porters have contended that the “general rule that one president cannot bind 
a later president” forecloses any interpretation of the president’s authority 
under the Antiquities Act which does not include the power to reduce and 
revoke existing national monuments.69  Others have similarly argued that the 
president’s authority under the Antiquities Act must be understood in relation 
to the broader “principle of American law . . . that the authority to execute a 
discretionary government power usually includes the power to revoke it.”70
In support of such broad presidential revocation powers, some legal 
scholars have compared the president’s authority under the Antiquities Act to 
the president’s power to issue executive orders and to terminate international 
63. See Squillace et al., supra note 56, at 58.
64. Proposed Abolishment of Castle Pinckney National Monument, 39 U.S. Op. Att’y 
Gen. 185 (1938).
65. See id.  See also Fanizzo, supra note 57, at 822.
66. See Squillace et al., supra note 56, at 58.
67. Proposed Abolishment of Castle Pinckney National Monument, supra note 64, at 
186 (emphasis added).
68. See, e.g., Richard H. Seamon, Dismantling Monuments, 70 Fla. L. Rev. 553, 595–97 
(2018).  Seamon argues that Attorney General Cummings’ 1938 opinion was “erroneous as 
a matter of law” and that “logic compels the conclusion that the President can abolish a 
monument.”  Id. at 595.  He attacks Cummings’ reliance on a prior attorney general’s opinion 
which stated that the president could not open lands to settlement that had already been 
reserved by him for the military.  Id.  Seamon also takes issue with the “general principles” 
relied upon by Cummings and argues that the attorney general’s opinion “relied on reason-
ing that merely begged the question of statutory interpretation.”  Id. at 596.
69. Id. at 588.
70. John Yoo & Todd Gaziano, Presidential Authority to Revoke or Reduce National 
Monument Designations, 35 Yale J. on Reg. 617, 639 (2018).
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agreements.71  These authors note that “presidents have always been under-
stood to be able to revoke executive orders issued by their predecessors” and 
that “the president retains the traditional executive authority to unilaterally 
terminate treaties” with foreign countries.72  Those who support monument 
reductions argue the president must similarly be able to revoke national 
monument designations made by prior presidents and that any contrary inter-
pretation of the Antiquities Act which limits presidential power would violate 
constitutional principles of equality among the three branches of government.73
In addition to the arguments described above about the generally broad 
nature of presidential powers, those who believe that the president has the 
power to reduce or revoke national monuments contend that the Supreme 
Court explicitly recognized this type of implied presidential authority in United 
States v. Midwest Oil Co.74 where Congress has acquiesced or otherwise failed 
to act.  Midwest Oil involved a challenge to President Taft’s temporary with-
drawal of over three million acres of public land in Wyoming and California 
from existing mining laws in an attempt to safeguard future oil reserves in the 
west for the U.S. Navy.75  The Pickett Act76 had not yet been passed at the time 
of President Taft’s withdrawal, and the plaintiffs in Midwest Oil challenged the 
president’s actions as outside the scope of his constitutional authority, claiming 
that the Property Clause authorized Congress, not the president, to regulate 
public lands.77  The Supreme Court decisively rejected this argument, pointing 
to a long list of previous public land withdrawals by presidents in the absence 
of specific statutory authority.78  The court noted that in these situations “Con-
gress did not repudiate the power claimed [by the President]” but instead 
71. See id. at 640–41;  see also Seamon, supra note 68, at 588.
72. Seamon, supra note 68, at 588; Yoo & Gaziano, supra note 70, at 646.
73. See Yoo & Gaziano, supra note 70, at 641 (reasoning that an “operating principle 
of the Constitution is that any branch of government can reverse its earlier actions using 
the same process originally used”); see also Seamon, supra note 68, at 589 (arguing that 
“[i]f the President . . . could be bound by the acts of predecessors, the President would lose 
the coequality with Congress that the Constitution requires.”).
74. 236 U.S. 459 (1915).
75. Id. at 466–67.  President Taft’s Secretary of the Interior recommended the with-
drawals after the Director of the Geological Survey submitted a report in 1909 describing the 
rapid increase in private mining claims in the western states and emphasizing the Director’s 
fear that all of the remaining valuable oil reserves could fall into private ownership in a mat-
ter of months.  Seamon, supra note 68, at 591 n.210.
76. Pickett Act, Pub. L. No. 303, 36 Stat. 847 (1910) (repealed 1976); see supra text 
accompanying notes 58–59.
77. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. at 468–69.
78. Id. at 469–71 (noting that, prior to the beginning of the case, previous presidents 
had issued a collective total of “99 Executive orders establishing or enlarging Indian res-
ervations[,] 109 Executive orders establishing or enlarging military reservations [and] 44 
Executive orders establishing bird reserves” despite lacking the specific statutory authority 
to take any of these actions).
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“uniformly and repeatedly acquiesced” to the president’s actions.79  The court 
went on to explain that Congress’s “acquiescence . . . operated as an implied 
grant of power” to the president, and upheld President Taft’s withdrawal.80
Those in support of national monument reductions rely on Midwest 
Oil to argue that the president similarly has the implied power to reduce or 
revoke preexisting national monument designations because Congress has 
repeatedly acquiesced to presidents who have done so in the past.81  None of 
these decisions by previous presidents have ever been challenged in court, and 
proponents of monument reductions contend that Congress has implicitly rec-
ognized the president’s authority to reduce national monuments by refusing 
to challenge these powers when the president has chosen to exercise them.82
In response, critics of monument reductions have pointed to Congress’s 
passage of the Federal Land Policy Management Act83 (FLPMA) in 1976 to 
argue that Congress has in fact repudiated, rather than acquiesced to, the pres-
ident’s implied authority to reduce preexisting national monuments under 
the Antiquities Act.84  In passing FLPMA, Congress consolidated and codi-
fied the powers of the executive branch regarding the management of federal 
public lands.85  FLPMA expressly stated that the Pickett Act and “the implied 
authority of the President to make withdrawals and reservations resulting 
from acquiescence of the Congress . . . are repealed.”86  Section 204 of FLPMA 
required the Secretary of the Interior to follow new and specific withdrawal 
procedures when attempting to “make, modify, extend, or revoke withdrawals” 
of public lands.87  While FLPMA explicitly addressed the Pickett Act and other 
79. Id. at 471.
80. Id. at 475.
81. See Yoo & Gaziano, supra note 70, at 659–60.  These scholars point to a num-
ber of national monument reductions by prior presidents, including those by presidents 
Eisenhower (reduced Great Sand Dunes National Monument in Colorado by 25 percent), 
Truman (reduced Santa Rosa Island National Monument in Florida by almost 50 percent), 
and Taft (reduced his own Navajo National Monument in Arizona by about 89 percent).  Id. 
The authors also note that presidents Taft, Wilson, and Coolidge collectively reduced Mount 
Olympus in Washington by almost half.  Id.
82. See id.  At least one scholar has also argued that a president’s decision to reduce 
or revoke national monuments is not judicially reviewable as a threshold matter because 
such decisions are administrative rather than legislative in nature, and as a result do not raise 
separation of powers concerns.  See Sorenson, supra note 27, at 35–36.
83. Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94–579, 90 Stat. 2743 
(1976) (codified primarily at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701–1782 (2012 & Supp. V 2018)) [hereinafter 
FLPMA].
84. See Squillace et al., supra note 56, at 59–64.
85. Id. at 59.
86. FLPMA §  704(a).  Section  704(a) of FLPMA explicitly states that Congress 
intended to overrule the congressional acquiescence endorsed by the court in United States 
v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459 (1915), though debate remains among legal scholars over the 
extent to which the broader doctrine of congressional acquiescence survives.
87. Id. at § 204(a).  Section 204 of FLPMA affords the Secretary of the Interior discretion 
in making certain emergency and small-scale withdrawals, but any withdrawals aggregating 
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executive powers relating to the management of public lands, it was notice-
ably silent on the president’s authority with respect to reducing or revoking 
national monuments under the Antiquities Act.
Those who argue that presidents do not have the authority to diminish 
preexisting national monuments stress that Congress used FLPMA to elim-
inate certain presidential withdrawal powers and to provide procedures for 
future executive withdrawals, but that in doing so Congress intentionally chose 
not to add language to the Antiquities Act that would give the president the 
power to reduce or revoke national monuments.88  Critics of monument reduc-
tions maintain that Congress contemplated the issue of revocation authority 
in Section 204 of FLPMA,89 and that the Act’s silence on presidential author-
ity under the Antiquities Act thus reflects a conscious choice on Congress’s 
part not to provide the president with authority to reduce or revoke national 
monument designations, but to instead retain this authority for itself under the 
Property Clause.90  Moreover, opponents of monument reductions note there 
have been no reductions to national monuments by presidents and thus no 
congressional acquiescence to such actions since FLPMA’s passage in 1976.91 
Additionally, those opposed to monument reductions argue that FLPMA 
“codified federal policy to retain—rather than dispose of  .  .  .  federal public 
lands” and that this broader policy goal weighs against an interpretation of the 
Antiquities Act that would allow the president to reduce preexisting national 
monument protections.92
These issues have perhaps never been timelier than they are right now. 
As noted above, President Trump’s recent reductions to the Bears Ears and 
Grand Staircase-Escalante national monuments in Utah represent the first 
attempt by a president to diminish a national monument since FLPMA was 
passed in 1976, overturning Midwest Oil and the doctrine of congressional 
acquiescence.93  The lawsuits filed against President Trump’s actions94 similarly 
wade into uncharted legal territory; these cases could have profound implica-
tions on our country’s national monuments for years to come.
five thousand acres or more must be published in the federal register and approved by both 
houses of Congress.
88. Squillace et al., supra note 56, at 59–61.
89. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
90. See Squillace et al., supra note 56, at 59–60.
91. See id. at 65 (noting that President Trump’s December 2017 reductions to the 
Bears Ears and Grand Staircase-Escalante national monuments represent the first attempt 
by a president to diminish preexisting national monuments since FLPMA was passed in 
1976).
92. Id. at 59;  see also Fanizzo, supra note 57, at 792.
93. See supra notes 8–12, 86 and accompanying text.
94. Hopi Tribe v. Trump, No. 17-cv-2590, 2017 WL 6033876 (D.D.C. filed Dec. 4, 2017); 
Wilderness Soc’y. v. Trump, No. 17-cv-2587, 2017 WL 6015958 (D.D.C. filed Dec. 4, 2017).
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II. Expanding Judicial Review: Courts Should Look to how 
Congress and the President Have Been Treated Historically 
in the Property Clause Context
As illustrated above, legitimate arguments exist both for and against 
interpreting the Antiquities Act to give the president the implied authority to 
reduce or revoke a preexisting national monument designation.  Where it is 
unclear whether the authority to take a certain action lies with the president 
or with Congress, courts and legal scholars have often turned to the approach 
taken in Justice Jackson’s famous concurrence analyzing executive power 
in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer.95  However, as discussed below, 
this framework of analysis is of limited utility to the debate about reducing 
national monuments.
In Youngstown, the Supreme Court considered a constitutional challenge 
to President Harry Truman’s Executive Order directing the Secretary of Com-
merce to seize a large portion of the country’s private steel mills.96  A divided 
court held that President Truman’s seizure order was unconstitutional, with 
Justice Jackson authoring a concurring opinion that provided a useful frame-
work for analyzing executive power.97  Justice Jackson divided his analysis of 
presidential power into three categories: first, cases where “the President acts 
pursuant to an express or implied authorization from Congress [and] his author-
ity is at its maximum”; second, instances where “the President acts in absence 
of either a congressional grant or denial of authority” (commonly referred to 
as the “zone of twilight”); and third, situations where the president “takes mea-
sures incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress, [and] his 
power is at its lowest ebb.”98  Justice Jackson concluded in Youngstown that 
President Truman’s Executive Order fell into the third category because it was 
inconsistent with preexisting statutory policies regarding the seizure of private 
property and the government’s power of eminent domain.99
95. 343 U.S. 579, 634 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring); see also Michael J. Turner, Fade to 
Black: The Formalization of Jackson’s Youngstown Taxonomy by Hamadan and Medellin, 58 
Am. U. L. Rev. 665, 667 (2009) (“Although not initially adopted by the Court [in Youngstown,] 
Jackson’s taxonomy is now recognized as the appropriate framework for analyzing nearly all 
executive action.”).
96. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 582.
97. Id. at 634–38 (Jackson, J., concurring).
98. Id. at 635–37.
99. Id. at 639–40.
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Although some courts100 and legal scholars101 have embraced Justice 
Jackson’s tripartite analysis of presidential power, others have criticized this 
framework as vague, open to multiple interpretations, and difficult to apply in 
practice.102  In his opinion, Justice Jackson acknowledged that his categorical 
approach to assessing executive power was limited to “a somewhat oversim-
plified grouping of practical situations.”103  These limitations become apparent 
when one tries to analyze the national monuments issue described above using 
Justice Jackson’s three-part taxonomy for presidential power, as a legitimate 
case may be made for placing the president’s implied power to reduce national 
monuments into any of the three categories put forth by Justice Jackson.  For 
example, some legal scholars have argued that the Antiquities Act operates 
as an implied authorization from Congress to reduce national monuments104 
(invoking the first category of Justice Jackson’s taxonomy), while others have 
argued that a president’s attempt to reduce national monuments is incompatible 
with Congress’s choice not to provide the president with such authority when 
passing FLPMA105 (and that the third category of Justice Jackson’s approach 
thus applies).  However, one could make a similarly strong case by appealing 
to the second of Justice Jackson’s categories, the “zone of twilight,” insofar as 
the Antiquities Act neither explicitly grants nor denies the power to reduce or 
revoke national monuments to the president.106  Justice Jackson’s three-part 
framework for analyzing executive power is thus ill-suited to address the ques-
tion of whether the president has the power to reduce national monuments 
under the Antiquities Act because such an action does not fit cleanly into any 
of the three categories which Justice Jackson puts forth.
100. See Dames & Moore v. Reagan, 433 U.S. 654, 661, 669 (1981) (asserting that Justice 
Jackson’s concurrence from Youngstown “brings together as much combination of analysis 
and common sense as there is in this area” and that the court considered his framework for 
analyzing executive power to be “analytically useful”); see also Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 
491, 497 (2008) (recognizing that “Justice Jackson’s familiar tripartite scheme provides the 
accepted framework for evaluating executive action”).
101. See Turner, supra note 95 at 667 (explaining that since Youngstown was decided, 
“Justice Jackson’s classification of the strength of executive power based on congressional 
action or inaction, his tripartite taxonomy, [has] dominated subsequent separation of powers 
jurisprudence”).
102. See Edward T. Swaine, The Political Economy of Youngstown, 83 S. Cal. L. Rev. 
263, 272 (2010) (arguing that “it has long been obvious that [Justice Jackson’s] Youngstown 
framework was open to manipulation”).
103. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring).
104. See, e.g., Seamon, supra note 68, at 584 (arguing that “the [Antiquities] Act should 
be interpreted to impliedly authorize abolition” of national monuments, and that such an 
interpretation “enables the President to carry out the constitutional duty to take care that 
the Antiquities Act is faithfully executed”).
105. Squillace et al., supra note 56, at 59–60.
106. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring); see also supra note 28, 
§ 320301(b).
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To obtain a properly holistic perspective on the issue of whether the 
president has the implied authority under the Antiquities Act to diminish pre-
existing national monument designations, one must begin by recognizing the 
limited utility of Justice Jackson’s analytical framework from Youngstown. 
Courts and legal scholars considering this issue in the future should then 
expand upon the analyses described in Part I, above, by examining how pres-
idents and Congress have been treated differently throughout our country’s 
history in the Property Clause context.  As discussed below, courts have histor-
ically afforded Congress significantly more deference than the president when 
regulating public lands or otherwise acting in the Property Clause context. 
To preserve traditional understandings of the separation of powers between 
Congress and the president, courts should thus resolve these tensions over the 
authority to regulate public lands, such as the current debate over the power to 
diminish national monuments, in favor of Congress.
A. Courts Have Consistently Interpreted Congress’s Powers in the Property 
Clause Context Broadly
Courts have typically understood the Property Clause, which grants 
Congress the “[p]ower to dispose of and make all needful [r]ules and [r]egu-
lations,”107 as giving immense power to Congress.108  The Hetch Hetchy Valley 
controversy was one of the earliest and perhaps most well-publicized exam-
ples of Congress’s plenary authority in this area.109  The debate centered on 
Congress’s passage of the Raker Act on December 3, 1913,110 which autho-
rized building the O’Shaughnessy Dam on the Tuolumne River in Yosemite 
National Park to provide a reliable source of water for San Francisco’s growing 
population.111  The project fueled an intense public debate,112 but the dam was 
ultimately built.  Moreover, the Supreme Court determined that Congress had 
acted within its proper authority in requiring the dam be operated solely by the 
city of San Francisco and its municipal agencies, based on Congress’s plenary 
authority over the disposition of the federal public domain.113  Although the 
107. U.S. Const. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
108. See Peter A. Appel, The Power of Congress “Without Limitation”: The Property 
Clause and Federal Regulation of Private Property, 86 Minn. L. Rev. 1 (2001).
109. See, e.g., Brian E. Gray, Hetch Hetchy and the Paradoxes of Restoration, 13 Hastings 
W.-N.W. J. Envtl. L. & Pol’y 211, 212–17 (2007); see also Symposium, Hetch Hetchy: To Drain 
or Not to Drain, 57 Hastings L.J. 1261 (2006).
110. Raker Act, Pub. L. No. 63–41, 38 Stat. 242 (1913).
111. See BW—Park Ranger, National Park Service, Remember Hetch Hetchy: The Raker 
Act and the Evolution of the National Park Idea (Dec. 20, 2013), https://www.nps.gov/yose/
blogs/remember-hetch-hetchy-the-raker-act-and-the-evolution-of-the-national-park-idea.
htm [https://perma.cc/296V-YPHP]; see also Symposium, supra note 109, at 1264.
112. See Gray, supra note 109, at 214–16.  The Hetch Hetchy Valley controversy pitted 
Gifford Pinchot and those who supported his utilitarian approach to resource management 
against preservationists and environmental advocates such as John Muir.  Id.
113. See United States v. City of San Francisco, 310 U.S. 16, 26–30 (1940) (prohibiting 
distribution of the dam’s power through the privately held Pacific Gas & Electric Company 
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Hetch Hetchy controversy may now be known best for having “planted a seed 
from which blossomed the modern environmental era,”114 the ultimate resolu-
tion allowing Congress to dictate Hetch Hetchy Valley’s flooding and the city 
of San Francisco’s operation of the dam underscores Congress’s strong and 
well-established authority in the Property Clause context.
The Supreme Court further recognized Congress’s broad authority to 
regulate public lands in a number of other significant decisions around this 
time, the first of these being Camfield v. United States.115  In Camfield, a group 
of private property owners in Colorado engaged in a clever scheme wherein 
each property owner erected a fence on his own private land, functionally 
enclosing about 20,000 acres of public lands for the exclusive use and bene-
fit of the property owners.116  Congress had sought to prevent these types of 
exclusive enclosures of public lands by passing a law prohibiting the enclosure 
of public lands where the individual who built the enclosure had “no claim 
or color of title made or acquired in good faith” to the enclosed lands.117  The 
defendants in Camfield contended that their fences were built solely on pri-
vate lands which were beyond the reach of Congress, but the Supreme Court 
firmly rejected this view, holding instead that Congress has the power under 
the Property Clause to regulate activities on private lands that substantially 
interfere with the public’s ability to use and access public lands.118  In sub-
sequent decisions, courts have continued to recognize Congress’s expansive 
authority under the Property Clause to regulate activities on private lands that 
affect federal public lands.119
One of the most recent and influential Supreme Court decisions fur-
ther recognizing Congress’s plenary Property Clause authority is Kleppe v. 
and holding that “Congress may constitutionally limit the disposition of the public domain to 
a manner consistent with its views of public policy”).
114. Gray, supra note 109, at 216.
115. 167 U.S. 518 (1897).
116. See id. at 519–21.  The individuals in Camfield owned and built fences upon all of 
the odd-numbered sections within the two townships in question in order to exclude public 
access to the even-numbered sections, which were owned by the United States.  See id. at 521 
for a helpful diagram of this enclosure scheme.
117. Act of Feb. 25, 1885, ch. 149, § 1, 23 Stat. 321 (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 1061 (2012)); 
see also Appel, supra note 108, at 63–64.
118. Camfield, 167 U.S. at 525 (reasoning that due to “the necessities of preventing the 
enclosure of public lands . . . the fence is clearly a nuisance, and . . . it is within the constitu-
tional power of congress to order its abatement, notwithstanding [that removing the fence] 
may involve entry upon the lands of a private individual.”).
119. See, e.g., United States v. Alford, 274 U.S. 264, 266–67 (1927) (upholding the consti-
tutionality of a statute establishing criminal liability for those who set fires near public lands 
and fail to extinguish them); Minnesota v. Block, 660 F.2d 1240, 1249–50 (8th Cir. 1981) (find-
ing that Congress acted within its authority under the Property Clause in restricting the use 
of motorboats and snowmobiles on nonfederal lands “that would threaten the designated 
purpose of federal lands.”); see also Appel, supra note 108, at 61–66.
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New Mexico.120  Kleppe involved a constitutional challenge by the State of 
New Mexico and others to Congress’s passage and enforcement of the Wild 
Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act,121 which “protected from capture, brand-
ing, harassment, or death . . . all unbranded and unclaimed horses and burros 
on public lands.”122  New Mexico’s state laws took a different approach, autho-
rizing the impoundment and auctioning of any stray horses found roaming the 
state’s public lands.123  New Mexico and the other plaintiffs in Kleppe chal-
lenged the federal government’s protections for the horses and burros on the 
grounds that the animals were not sufficiently involved in interstate commerce 
to fall within Congress’s reach.124  The Supreme Court rejected this argument 
and sided with Congress yet again, upholding the Wild Free-Roaming Horses 
and Burros Act as “a constitutional exercise of congressional power under the 
Property Clause.”125  In extending Congress’s Property Clause authority from 
the public land itself to the horses and burros occupying the land, the Court 
reiterated that “determinations under the Property Clause are entrusted pri-
marily to the judgment of Congress.”126
B. Courts Have More Rigorously Questioned and Challenged the 
President’s Powers in the Property Clause Context
Unlike Congress, the president does not benefit from an established line 
of Supreme Court precedent expanding his authority in the Property Clause 
context.127  In fact, a thorough review of federal caselaw involving public lands 
reveals that attempts by prior presidents to act unilaterally in the Property 
Clause context are comparatively rare in our country’s history.  As demon-
strated below, these infrequent efforts by prior presidents have been met with 
strong opposition,128 which stands in stark contrast to the broad authority that 
courts have traditionally afforded to Congress under the Property Clause.129
One of the earliest and perhaps most interesting attempts by a presi-
dent to assert his authority in the Property Clause context involved a dispute 
between President Thomas Jefferson and a prominent lawyer named Edward 
Livingston.  The dispute concerned the ownership of a portion of a large 
120. 426 U.S. 529 (1976).
121. Id. at 531–32.
122. Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act, Pub. L. No. 92–195, 85 Stat. 649 (codi-
fied as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1331–1340 (2012)).
123. See Kleppe, 426 U.S. at 533.
124. See id.
125. Id. at 546.
126. Id. at 536.  The Court paid special attention to the low thresholds established by the 
Property Clause’s reference to Congress’s power to make all “needful” regulations “respect-
ing” the public lands.  Id.; see supra note 28, § 320301(b) (emphasis added).
127. Cf. supra notes 116–26 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court deci-
sions which recognized Congress’s broad authority under the Property Clause).
128. See infra notes 131–64 and accompanying text.
129. See Appel, supra note 108, at 58.
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“batture,”130 or sandbank, which had accumulated along the shores of the Mis-
sissippi River.131  The land in question had been used by the public as a mooring 
spot for boats and other vessels since before Louisiana became a state, and 
the local residents had long considered the batture to be public property.132 
In 1805, Livingston assisted a local property owner who held land adjacent to 
the riverbank in acquiring exclusive ownership of part of the batture by filing 
suit in the Superior Court for the Territory of Orleans.133  Livingston secured 
an ownership interest in a portion of the batture for himself from his client 
and began making improvements on his share of the land almost immediately, 
including the construction of a canal and a levee.134
While local residents tried to protest Livingston’s privatization of his por-
tion of the batture by harassing and obstructing the laborers whom he hired 
to work on the land, Governor Claiborne of the Territory of Orleans was left 
with little legal recourse other than to ask President Jefferson to step in.135 
After Governor Claiborne made this request, President Jefferson attempted 
to establish federal ownership of the batture by directing his Secretary of State 
to instruct the U.S. Marshal for the Territory of Orleans to expel Livingston 
from the batture and to assert federal title to the land “using whatever force 
was necessary.”136  Livingston was removed from the batture but persisted, 
suing both President Jefferson personally in the federal circuit court in Rich-
mond137 as well as the federal marshal who removed him from the batture in 
the federal court in New Orleans.138  Livingston ultimately prevailed against 
the federal marshal in the latter case, with the court declaring the marshal’s 
warrant invalid and returning title of the disputed land to Livingston.139
Livingston’s other case against President Jefferson in Virginia, however, 
was eventually unsuccessful.  The court in that case dismissed Livingston’s 
claims on purely jurisdictional grounds under the applicable local trespass 
action rule140 and never explicitly ruled on whether President Jefferson had 
130. The word “batture” is of French origin and has generally been understood to refer 
to certain areas where the riverbed has risen close to or above the water’s surface level, and 
where a sandbank has begun to form.  John A. Lovett, Comment, Batture, Ordinary High 
Water, and the Louisiana Levee Servitude, 69 Tul. L. Rev. 561, 568–70 (1994).
131. Ronan E. Degnan, Livingston v. Jefferson—A Freestanding Footnote, 75 Calif. L. 
Rev. 115, 116 (1987); see also John B. Boles, Jefferson: Architect of American Liberty 
441–44 (2017).
132. Degnan, supra note 131, at 116.
133. Id.
134. Id.; 6 Dumas Malone, Jefferson and His Time: The Sage of Monticello 55–57 
(1981).
135. See Degnan, supra note 131, at 117.
136. Id.
137. See id.; Livingston v. Jefferson, 15 F. Cas. 660 (C.C.D. Va. 1811) (No. 8411).
138. See Degnan, supra note 131, at 117, 124.
139. See id. at 124 n.34.
140. See id. at 122; Livingston, 15 F. Cas. at 663.
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exceeded his authority under the Property Clause.141  Interestingly, Jefferson 
and Livingston publicly continued their dispute even after the court dismissed 
the case; both published lengthy public pamphlets detailing why Jefferson did 
or did not have the authority as president to seize Livingston’s portion of the 
batture as he had.142  The resulting lack of any binding legal decision on the 
substantive issue of whether President Jefferson had the authority to seize the 
batture, coupled with the fact that Livingston ultimately acquired title to the 
lands in question, highlights the way in which the president’s authority in the 
Property Clause context is far less established than that of Congress.143
Another dispute from the 19th century that further illustrates the presi-
dent’s weak and unsettled authority in the Property Clause context relative to 
Congress involved an attempt by President Zachary Taylor to remove groups 
of Native Americans from certain public lands in the Midwest and to prohibit 
them from continuing to use those public lands under preexisting treaties.144 
On February 6, 1850, in response to growing concerns over conflicts between 
Indian tribes and white settlers in the Lake Superior area in northern Wis-
consin, President Taylor signed the controversial 1850 Removal Order.145  The 
Order directed that the Chippewas Indians be physically removed from the 
lands in the Lake Superior area, which they had been granted the right to 
occupy by a treaty in 1842, and it revoked the tribe’s usufructuary rights in the 
land acquired through a treaty in 1837 which included the tribe’s rights to hunt, 
fish, and gather wild rice on the land.146
Many years later, President Taylor’s Removal Order was challenged in 
multiple cases, which were consolidated in Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Lake 
Superior Chippewa Indians v. Voigt in the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals.147 
In that case, the Seventh Circuit held President Taylor’s Removal Order was 
invalid because the tribes had not violated the 1837 and 1842 treaties, despite 
the two treaties’ favorable language granting the above rights to the Chippewa 
Indians “during the pleasure of the President” and “until required to remove 
141. Livingston, 15 F. Cas. at 660–65.
142. See Boles, supra note 131, at 443–44; see also Malone, supra note 134, at 69–70. 
Jefferson published a ninety-one-page pamphlet summarizing his legal arguments for seizing 
the batture even after the case was dismissed in his favor, using the long title: “The Proceedings 
of the Government of the United States, in Maintaining the Public Right to the Beach of the 
Mississippi, Adjacent to New-Orleans, Against the Intrusion of Edward Livingston.”  Id. 
Livingston responded with a lengthy public pamphlet of his own.  See Degnan, supra note 
131, at 117 n.10.
143. See supra note 127.
144. Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. Voigt, 700 F.2d 
341, 344-45 (7th Cir. 1983).
145. See id. at 345–46; Colin Mustful, Resisting Removal: The Removal Order of 1850, 
Colin Mustful: History Through Fiction (Sept. 12, 2018),  http://www.colinmustful.com/
resisting-removal-the-removal-order-of-1850 [https://perma.cc/ADF4-2W4G].
146. See Voigt, 700 F.2d at 346.
147. See id. at 343.
2020 DOWNSIzING NATIONAL MONUMENTS 101
by the President” respectively.148  The court declined to view this language as 
support for the president’s discretion to regulate the tribe’s use and occupancy 
of the public lands, instead reasoning that the “language in the two treaties did 
not confer the unlimited discretion on the Executive that it appears to.”149  The 
court also observed that the Indians were not “instrumental in causing distur-
bances with white settlers” as prohibited by the treaties and it reinstated the 
tribe’s rights under both treaties.150  The court’s willingness to reverse President 
Taylor’s decisions regarding the Indians’ rights to the public lands in the Lake 
Superior area despite the language of the treaties affording the president sig-
nificant discretion further demonstrates the historically limited nature of the 
president’s power in the Property Clause context.
The most recent and directly applicable example of the president’s 
narrow authority when acting in the Property Clause context involves a thus 
far unsuccessful attempt by President Trump to lift protections against offshore 
oil and gas development put in place by President Obama in 2015 and 2016 on 
about 124 million acres in the Arctic Ocean and parts of the North Atlantic 
Coast.151  To prevent future drilling in these ecologically sensitive areas, Presi-
dent Obama used his authority under Section 12(a) of the Outer Continental 
Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA),152 which provides the president with the power to 
“withdraw from disposition any of the unleased lands of the outer Continental 
Shelf.”153  Just like the Antiquities Act,154 Section 12(a) of OCSLA delegates a 
limited portion of Congress’s Property Clause authority to the president, grant-
ing him the power to withdraw public lands on the outer continental shelf from 
future disposal, but remaining silent on the authority to revoke such withdraw-
als.155  President Trump nevertheless attempted to rescind President Obama’s 
withdrawals through an Executive Order on April 28, 2017, titled “Implement-
ing an America-First Offshore Energy Strategy.”156  Environmental groups 
sued,157 challenging the president’s order and making many of the same legal 
148. Id. at 351, 362.
149. Id. at 357 (emphasis added).
150. Id.
151. Coral Davenport, Trump’s Order to Open Arctic Waters to Oil Drilling Was Unlawful, 
Federal Judge Finds, N.Y. Times (Mar. 30, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/30/climate/
trump-oil-drilling-arctic.html [https://perma.cc/SV5Z-5WTD].
152. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331–1356(b) (2012).
153. Id. § 1341(a).  The Act defines the “outer Continental Shelf” as “all submerged 
lands . . . subsoil and seabed” within the federal government’s exclusive jurisdiction, which 
extends 200 miles off the coast to the edge of the United States’ exclusive economic zone. 
Id. §  1331; see also Jayni Foley Hein, Monumental Decisions: One-Way Levers Towards 
Preservation in the Antiquities Act and Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 48 Lewis & Clark 
Envtl L. Rev. 125, 133 (2018).
154. See supra note 28.
155. 43 U.S.C. § 1341(a) (2012).
156. Exec. Order No. 13,795, 82 Fed. Reg. 20,815 (Apr. 28, 2017); see also Hein, supra 
note 153, at 128.
157. See League of Conservation Voters v. Trump, No. 3:17-cv-00101-SLG (D. Alaska 
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arguments discussed above relating to the president’s authority to reduce or 
revoke national monuments.158
On March 29, 2019, the U.S. Federal District Court of Alaska hearing 
the case issued an order granting summary judgment in favor of the plain-
tiffs and against President Trump in a decision that both reaffirmed the broad 
authority exercised by President Obama in the first instance while framing 
President Trump’s authority to undo these actions narrowly in the absence of 
specific statutory authorization.159  The court held that President Trump’s Exec-
utive Order attempting to revoke President Obama’s prior withdrawals under 
OSCLA was “unlawful, as it exceeded the president’s authority under Section 
12(a) of OSCLA.”160  The court further explained its reasoning in terms that 
apply with equal force to the Antiquities Act, asserting that “Congress’s silence 
in Section 12(a) as to according the President revocation authority was likely 
purposeful; had Congress intended to grant the President revocation author-
ity, it could have done so explicitly, as it had previously done.”161  The court also 
noted its approval of several arguments described above162 which are shared 
by those opposed to national monument reductions, such as the significance 
of explicit revocation provisions in other federal public lands laws163 and the 
Attorney General opinions interpreting their relevance.164  While the decision 
is likely to be appealed to the Ninth Circuit,165 the District Court’s order lends 
strong support to the arguments described in Part I, above, regarding the sig-
nificance of the Antiquities Act’s silence on a president’s authority to reduce 
or revoke national monuments.
III. Applying the History of the Property Clause to Reducing 
National Monuments
Where then, does this leave us?  As explained in Part II, a thorough review 
of federal caselaw concerning the Property Clause demonstrates that courts 
have afforded Congress, rather than the president, significant discretion with 
filed May 3, 2017).
158. Id.; see also supra notes 55–92 and accompanying text.
159. Order re Motions for Summary Judgment, League of Conservation Voters v. 
Trump, No. 3:17-cv-00101-SLG (D. Alaska filed May 3, 2017), ECF No. 80.
160. Id. at 30.
161. Id. at 23.
162. See supra notes 86–87 and accompanying text.
163. See supra note 159, at 20–22.  The court was persuaded by the plaintiffs’ arguments 
contrasting OSCLA Section 12(a)’s silence on revoking withdrawals under the Act with the 
unambiguous revocation provisions in the Pickett Act, the Forest Service Organic Act, and a 
1935 Act regarding use of the Rio Grande river.  Id. at 22.
164. See id. at 24–25 n.79.  The court also recognized the importance of multiple opin-
ions by Attorneys General which concluded that revocation authority must be made explicit, 
including Attorney General Cummings’ 1938 opinion regarding the proposed abolishment of 
Castle Pinckney National Monument.  See supra note 64.
165. See Davenport, supra note 151.
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regard to managing federal public lands.  Yet, there is a real tension between 
these cases and those specifically addressing a president’s authority under the 
Antiquities Act, described above in Part I.A, in that courts have been much 
more willing to grant presidents wide discretion when designating new national 
monuments.  How then, should a court approach President Trump’s attempt to 
reduce the Bears Ears and Grand Staircase-Escalante national monuments?
The District Court of Alaska’s recent opinion in League of Conserva-
tion Voters v. Trump, discussed above, helps to shed light on this issue.  As 
previously noted, the court in that case found President Trump’s attempted 
revocation of President Obama’s withdrawals under OCSLA was beyond both 
his statutory and constitutional authority.166  OCSLA and the Antiquities Act 
are remarkably similar; both statutes delegate to the president the power to 
withdraw public lands, but do not address a president’s authority to undo such 
withdrawals.  Unlike previous courts, which have granted prior presidents who 
designated new national monuments a wide margin of discretion, the court 
in this case did not interpret President Trump’s authority broadly because 
“[OCSLA] does not expressly grant to the President the authority to revoke 
prior withdrawals” made under OCSLA.167  The court’s analysis embodied 
nearly identical arguments to those described above in Part I.B and advanced 
by those opposed to monument reductions.  This decision ought to serve as 
a roadmap for the national monument reductions issue, since the Antiquities 
Act similarly does not expressly grant the president authority to revoke prior 
monument designations.  Thus, courts reviewing the challenges to President 
Trump’s reductions of the Bears Ears and Grand Staircase-Escalante national 
monuments should follow the lead of the District Court of Alaska and uphold 
the initial monument designations made by Presidents Obama and Clinton. 
This approach properly balances Congress’s broad Property Clause authority 
with the tradition of affording discretion to presidents who initially designate 
national monuments by appropriately confining the president’s powers to 
those expressly delegated in the Antiquities Act.
166. See supra note 159, at 11, 16.
167. Id. at 17.

